



















**At the current prices, the Classic Fund is cheap, yielding a 16/17% expected return, with an updated I.V. of EUR 680**

Over the many years of valuing numerous companies, we have learned that an expected IRR of 20% is roughly equivalent to doubling their value in 3-4 years. The Classic currently yields a 17% return, not far from the 20% level. Should the recovery materialize in the way we think it will, the NAV should be around EUR 500 within two years - at the end of 2021 - and move toward EUR 680 in the medium term.

In the Q1 newsletter, we withdrew our 2020 NAV target due to the GCC leading to lower visibility and set a EUR 500 target for Dec. 21, a target we are sticking to (*we did this before the Chinese government withdrew its 2020 GDP growth target!*). If, as we think, the global economy is back to normal by 2022, the market will anticipate this as early as next year, and the Classic will return to a more normalized return of 11-13%.

**At SIA, we believe that it is important to set valuation targets for the companies we buy and the funds we manage.** First, because we must calculate returns and intrinsic values in order to buy the stocks at the right levels (and also stress testing downside scenarios); second, because it is important to know when the fund is cheap or not, in order to enhance its positioning; and, finally, because it forces us to work harder, to be disciplined, to know the companies, and to know the portfolio, all of which should lead to our investments performing better.

In fact, this is one of the few things where we disagree with the Omaha oracle who never publishes targets or valuations and used to say that the future is unknown. We respect this view but establishing a base-case scenario whose assumptions are backed by common sense and experience, gives us clear performance objectives for each company and for the funds, which is extremely useful for us, and, we hope, for our investors.

**The Classic look through**

**The Classic has a backbone of compounders, or quality, or growth at a reasonable price (GARP), comprising about 40% of the fund** and which are highly diversified companies, such as VISA, ASML, Unilever, Viscofan, Apple, Medtronic, Grifols, etc. These are all business models about which we need to worry very little, since they are excellent franchises with extremely solid strategic positions (moats). When selecting such companies, the added value that we try to provide lies in the businesses' strategic analysis and in our effort to buy them when they experience a rough patch, therefore becoming somewhat cheaper.

**60% of the Fund is invested in more traditional value stocks**, namely in sectors and companies that we believe are very cheap relative to their intrinsic values (we are patiently increasing this part of the Fund during the downturn). As a result of our bottom-up analysis, we have found ourselves concentrated on five sectors where we believe there is a lot of value: **oil/energy (9%), aerospace (7%), salmon (7%), building materials (7%), copper/mining (10%), business services (8%),** and accounting for another 40-45%. The remaining 15% is invested in different sectors/businesses, such as ING (bank), Pandora (affordable jewelry), and Prysmian (electric/telco cables).

In aerospace, a sector that we believe will have a bright future once the effects of Covid-19 have been digested, **we have bought back MTU Aeroengines**, an old friend that fell a lot during the crisis but will recover without problems in a couple of years' time. In this sector, we already own Thales and Raytheon (formerly United Technologies), two strong businesses that will have a tough year in 2020.

Within the consumer discretionary broad sector, which is obviously cyclical, **we have two large positions Sodexo (catering) and ISS (cleaning)**, two companies that fell quite a lot during the crisis, but in which we do not see liquidity or solvency problems. We also think that both will be back to normal in 2021, from both a business and a stock market perspective. ISS has an option that the market has not priced in so far: it should benefit from the hygiene measures that almost all companies and public administrations will have to implement.

#### **The LTIF Natural Resources is up 50% from the lows but remains incredibly cheap**

The Natural Resources Fund has recovered 50% from the March lows with a NAV of 75 euros per share, or -29% ytd. The Fund has an intrinsic value of more than EUR 183 per share and, at current prices, an IRR of 22%.

We have taken advantage of the strong market correction since March to sell part of our food investments (especially salmon) and to buy more energy and mines, which are trading at strike prices. **In mid-June, the fund has 40% of its investment in energy/oil and another 40% in mines, with only 20% in agri-food and infrastructures.** Generally, we try to balance it out a bit more with 1/3 in each sector (energy, mining, and agrifood&infra), but given the current valuations, we have been raising the weight of energy and mines.

#### **1. Oil. Covid-19 is only a pause in the upward cycle**

In terms of oil, we are quite comfortable, because **the market has gone into an undersupply situation faster than expected** following the OPEC+ cuts, shale collapse, and the well shut-ins caused by low oil prices. Following the decision of the OPEC++ to cut production further, inventories have peaked, and oil prices moved to marginal cash cost levels (around USD 40 Brent).

Against a backdrop of undersupply, but high inventories, oil prices generally move up slowly (from the marginal cash cost, but below the incentive price) until the inventories normalize. According to our figures, inventories should normalize in Q221, but some experts are already suggesting Q420 on the basis of the better demand performance. Once inventories are back to normal, the oil incentive prices are usually reached (around USD 70 Brent), since an increase in production is required to meet demand. **Our model suggests we should end 2020 at around USD 50 per barrel Brent (again, thanks to OPEC+ cuts), and move towards incentive levels in 2021.**


Summarizing the sector situation in a few sentences, we think that 1) shale does not work below USD 60 Brent, meaning that shale production could fall by c.3m b/d, unless oil prices move up sharply. 2) OPEC+, which has far lower costs, is slowly going to replace those 3m plus 1-2m b/d globally requiring higher prices. 3) OPEC+ will try to manage prices and inventories in a USD 60-USD 75 range.

Aside from increasing the existing exposure to oil, we also started investing in some new names. **Pioneer and EOG, two of the leading US E&Ps, have joined the portfolio.** These 2 companies are highly rated, have excellent management teams, a proven track record, and a sound exposure to shale oil in the Permian.

**We have also bought a position in Surgutneftegaz,** the third largest oil producer in Russia after the state-owned Rosneft and Lukoil (US, Saudi Arabia, and Russia are the 3 major oil producing countries, each of which has around 10% of the total supply). The company is the best-run Russian oil company, has nearly double the recovery rate that its peers have, its reserve replacement ratio was 120% during

the past few years (all organic), its idle well rate is the lowest in of the industry, and it has a nearly 100% utilization rate of its associated petroleum gas production.

Surgutneftegas trades at 3 times cashflow and has a huge net cash position. We cannot state the EV/EBITDA multiple, **as the company's cash position is over USD 50 b, double the market cap.**




Gold/Oil ratio, opportunity of a century?

## 2. We expect a structural change in shale oil

Shale oil is facing a structural change from uncontrolled growth with unlimited funding **to first a reset at a lower level (we estimate 5-6 m b/d) and thereafter consolidation, growth within cash-flow, return on (and to) capital, and discipline.**

Shale oil works, but only in a more controlled manner, in order to reverse what the chart below shows, spiced with the >USD 200 bn debt.



Remember that the rig count was already falling long before the GCC, meaning that a large number of wells did not work below USD 60 Brent. The financial markets have burnt their fingers and will closely

monitor those frackers that do not demonstrate financial discipline. The situation and outcome might even be comparable to the oil sands in Athabasca, where the extraction also differs fundamentally from extracting from an underground liquid reservoir.

Tar sands are large-scale open pit or underground in-situ operations. In-situ is used for deposits that are too deep or too thin for conventional underground mining (a major part of world's Uranium, mostly in Kazakhstan, uses in-situ leaching) and the economics are very different from that of conventional oil production.

Fifteen years ago, oil sands were a big hype. **Nobody cared about the proper calculations of returns and, with oil prices high, the players focused on organic reserve growth or replacement and energy companies all over the world invested in such projects.** Fort McMurray became a hotspot; it had some of the highest real estate prices and the highest Starbucks hourly earnings in North America, which led to a typical gold rush situation (note that the average annual temperature is 0.5 degrees Celsius and as soon as the ice thaws, mosquitoes arrive). This boom came to an abrupt end when the oil price collapsed in 2008, most projects stalled, were divested, etc.

Since major European oil companies tend to act in a very procyclical manner, they invest billions at USD 100 oil, while at USD 30 they make themselves fit for ever declining oil prices. Suncor produced its first oil from sands in the 1970s and most oil sands projects, with opex/bbl at around \$35, are good businesses for experienced operators. Despite the end of the boom, large operations like Syncrude and Albian Sands continued to produce or grow and became more efficient. Leading companies like Suncor and CNQ took the opportunity and bought interests in companies like Royal Dutch, which sold at the bottom after investing billions at the peak. Today, most oil sand production is in the hands of CNQ and Suncor whilst minority interests are still owned by Chevron, Exxon's subsidiary Imperial, and the Chinese state-owned companies CNOOC and Sinopec.

**US shale might be in a comparable situation. The boom is over. Investments and subsequent production have started to decline.** After years of ignoring proper economic calculations, reality is setting in, many players will disappear, and the market will consolidate. EOG and Pioneer are the most efficient companies, the only ones that ever-made money. Within a few years, they might be in a similar situation as CNQ/Suncor with regard to tar sands.

#### Recessions and crisis provide opportunities to invest cheaply

As long as we do not make unforced errors (bad business and debt, mainly), stock market falls should become investment opportunities for us and our investors, since we can buy the same assets at much lower prices. And that is what we are doing, **strengthening our positions in companies that we already have (e.g., Wienerberger and Heidelberg Cement) or buying new ones from our watch list (e.g., MTU Aeroengines and EOG).**

Buffett repeatedly comments that he would like to live through many crises and recessions, which is something that a long-only fund with daily liquidity finds difficult to cope with. But he is right, the objective of the Classic as a vehicle and of us/our clients as the final investors is to invest our savings and reinvest our profits, and thus the best thing for the Classic and its investors is for the stock market to fall, allowing us to buy cheaper and gain a higher return in the medium to long term.

We have come close to enjoying recessions having experienced two of the worst in history in 2008/09 (GFC) and 2020 (GCC), but it is tough, incredibly tough. Let's try to follow Buffet again and enjoy the current crisis, be constructive when the stock market drops, when the economy deteriorates, and when things go wrong, because stocks become very cheap, which is the basis of value investing.

**The key to succeed is having a quality fund before any crisis materializes, something that we will be pursuing slowly but surely in the short, medium, and long term.**

**It is time for value investing**

As we can see in the graph, the value strategy has underperformed strongly in the last 3 years, mainly for the two following reasons: 1) the performance of the FAANGS (and huge market caps.), and 2) the Covid-19 crisis which, in the short term, negatively affects cyclical stocks and value in general.



Starting from the cyclicals' current depressed valuation (very normal in an economic downturn, led by commodities, industrials, autos, banks, and insurers) and the sky-high ratings of most FAANGS and health stocks, we think that the value strategy will recover what it has lost in recent years. We do not doubt that most of the FAANGs are excellent companies, but it will be difficult for them to maintain the recent high-growth pace in the long term.

**The Classic Fund has beaten the indices since 2002 but has underperformed slightly since 2009. We believe that in the next few years we will see some "mean reversion," allowing value to regain ground and the Classic Fund to outperform. We will see.**

### **Moving to ESG**

Many months ago, we decided to accelerate the transition to a more sustainable investment model by following stricter Environment Social Governance (ESG) criteria.

From now on we will undertake an ESG due diligence of each company and apply a rating. Our intention is to create 3 ESG categories (just as we created 4 risk categories in the past) and to apply an A - high ESG compliance, B - medium ESG compliance, and C - low rating, to each company; this will allow us to gradually identify which companies lead the pack, which are failing to make the required transition and invest accordingly.

This is not really new to us, as the Classic has already been awarded an AA ESG rating by MSCI, but we want to make progress by structuring our process better. We are convinced that high ESG standards are going to be increasingly relevant for the investment world and are therefore moving steadily in that direction.

**Marcos Hernández Aguado**  
**Urs Marti**  
**SIA Team**  
**June 23th, 2020**

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**Telekurs:** 3'101'820  
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**Bloomberg:** LTIFCLD LX

### **LTIF – SRI USD**

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**Bloomberg:** LTISTAC

### **Central Administration Agent:**

FundPartner Solutions (Europe) SA  
15 avenue J.F. Kennedy  
L-1855 Luxembourg  
Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg

### **Investment Manager:**

SIA Funds AG  
Alpenblickstrasse 25  
CH-8853 Lachen  
Switzerland

### **Custodian:**

Pictet & Cie (Europe) SA  
15A avenue J.F. Kennedy  
L-1855 Luxembourg  
Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg

### **Registered Office:**

15 avenue J.F. Kennedy  
L-1855 Luxembourg  
Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg